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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2-(3)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. I 
There is no causal nexus for Appellants' claim for damages; damage calculation 
would be purely conjectural. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Insofar as this matter is resolved pursuant to Rule 56 (c) and (e) of the Utah R. Civ.P. 
and pursuant to Rules 801 and 803 of the Utah R. Evid., this matter is one that can be decided 
as a matter of law and should be reviewed for correctness considering the evidentiary basis 
for the District Court's decision. (Rl 15, 381, 417). Thurston v. Worker's Comp. Fund. 83 
P.3d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Mahmood v. Ross. 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
Appellants preserved this issue before the Trial Court in both of their motions for 
summary judgment. (R115, 381, 417). 
ISSUE NO. II 
Appellants provided no admissible evidence to specifically oppose Appellees' 
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renewed motion for summary judgment on the issue of causation. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Parties opposing summary judgment have a duty to "set forth specific facts showing 
there is a genuine issue for trial". Appellants failed in this regard and this issue can be 
decided pursuant to Rule 56(e) Utah R.Civ.P. as a matter of law. See DLB Collection Trust 
v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593 (Utah App. 1995); Norman v. Arnold. 57 P.3d 997 (Utah 2002). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue was preserved by Appellees on multiple occasions before the lower court. 
(R115, 381,417). 
ISSUE NO. Ill 
Appellants' present characterization of William Pringle as a witness for purposes of 
Rule 801 of the Utah R. Evid. is untenable. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under the facts of this case, whether Mr. William Pringle will be a witness is 
something that was factually determined by Judge Mower on direct inquiry to Appellants. 
Insofar as William Pringle would not be a witness at trial and had never been deposed by 
Appellants, consequently, pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) Utah R. Evid., Mr. William Pringle 
cannot be classified as a witness. This can be determined as a matter of law. 
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PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
Judge Mower's ruling in this regard may be reviewed as a matter of law and was 
preserved before the Trial Court by Appellees. (R381,417). 
ISSUE NO. IV 
Appellants' arguments seeking to shift the burden of proof in both tort and contract 
law are legally untenable. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As a matter of law in Utah, Appellants, framing their complaint in either contract or 
tort, bear the burden of proof of causation. Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 132 P.2d 680 
(Utah 1943); Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund, 83 P.3d391(Ut. Ct. App. 2003). Appellants 
seek that this Court create an evidentiary inroad so that the burden of proof on these theories 
shifts to Appellees by presumption. Appellants' request that the Court of Appeals alter Utah 
law can be resolved as a matter of law. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This matter can be decided as a matter of law and these same presumptions were 
preserved in all of Appellants' summary judgment memoranda placed before the Court. 
(R115, 381,417). 
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ISSUE NO. V 
Reviewed for correctness, the District Court's legal conclusions are sustainable as a 
matter of law. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal, the District Court's conclusions are reviewed for correctness. See Newman 
v. Sonnenberg. 81 P.3d 808 (Utah App. 2003). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue is properly raisable on appeal pursuant to Rule 24(a)(5)(B) of the Utah R. 
App. P. 
ISSUE NO. VI 
Appellants, in failing to timely file any objections to the District Court's Findings, 
Conclusions, and Summary Judgment, have waived their objections. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In the instant case, waiver combines a blending of issues of both law and fact. 
Generally, however, issues that are not raised at trial are usually deemed waived. See 
Brookside Mobile Home Park. Ltd. v Peebles. 48 P.3d 968 (Utah 2002). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue is factually preserved in the record at R447,470-448, 459. It is raised on 
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appeal pursuant to Rule 24(a)(5)(B) Utah R. App. P insofar as the waiver occurred by reason 
of Appellants' indolence between that period of time that the proposed findings, conclusions, 
and judgment were submitted to the District Court and the final entry of the same. See Rule 
7, Utah R. Civ.P. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES, STATUTES, AND ORDINANCES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) and (e) 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. . . 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting 
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
of denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against a party failing to file such a response. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(f)(2): 
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Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party 
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties 
a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the 
proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing 
the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or 
upon expiration of the time to object. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(1)(A): 
Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: (l)prior 
statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) 
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made 
the statement or has forgotten. . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants filed their suit in Kane County seeking recovery against Appellees on 
theories bottomed in breach of contract and tort. Appellants moved for summary judgment 
based upon the multiple affidavits of an non-party, William Pringle. In 2004, the District 
Court denied Appellants' motion and indicated the matter would go forward at trial with 
Appellants being given the opportunity to bring in potentially inconsistent statements of Mr. 
Pringle as a witness at trial pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah R. Evid. Appellees 
subsequently deposed Mr. William Pringle's son, Bryan Pringle, who both reconfirmed 
William Pringle's affidavits and further disclosed that William Pringle would be unavailable 
for trial, having suffered a cortical stroke four years after the alleged events in question. 
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Upon renewal of the summary judgment, the Appellants advised the District Court that Mr. 
William Pringle was not available for trial and, in light thereof, based on the prior affidavits 
of William Pringle and the deposition of Bryan Pringle, Judge Mower entered summary 
judgment for Appellees on the issue of causation and awarded Appellants nominal damages. 
The Appellants claim before the District Court for punitive damages is not appealed from 
herein; it was earlier denied in federal court by Judge Kimball and is res judicata. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants retained Appellees, Southern Utah Title Company (hereinafter "SUTCO"), 
and Brad Adair, with instructions to attend a tax sale in Kane County and bid up to 
$3 5,000.00 on Lot 25, Plat B, Zions View Mountain Estates (hereinafter "the real property"). 
Appellee, Ray Spencer, an employee of SUTCO, attended the tax sale on May 20, 1999. 
Also in attendance was William Pringle. Mr. Pringle, one of the prior developers of the 
property, subscribed to the Southern Utah News and had traveled from Sun City, Arizona 
to specifically bid on this property which Mr. Pringle described as a one acre rim lot, 
believed by Pringle to have a value, at the time of the tax sale, in excess of $50,000.00. 
(R121-117). At the tax sale, Pringle continued to outbid Appellee Spencer and the property 
was struck off for sale for the sum of $11,250.00, well in excess of its assessed value. 
Appellants, like William Pringle, who were residents of Arizona, initially filed their 
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case in Federal Court seeking damages as against Appellees based on theories of breach of 
contract and negligence and further seeking punitive damages to establish diversity 
jurisdiction. After significant discovery, Appellants produced no evidence that Appellees had 
acted in concert with Mr. Pringle or in any other manner giving rise to punitive damages. 
Judge Kimball consequently ruled that Appellants, in failing to demonstrate entitlement to 
punitive damages, could not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement for federal 
diversity jurisdiction. Judge Kimball then dismissed the action. (See, Exhibit "A" to 
Addendum 1 of this Brief). All parties now concede that Judge Mower's sixth finding 
referencing punitive damages precludes their reassertion either in the Utah Courts or on 
appeal. Judge Mower's sixth finding is set forth as follows: 
6. It is presently undisputed by either Plaintiffs or Defendants that 
Judge Kimball's Order, in reference to Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages 
is res judicata and, insofar as the same was not appealed at the Federal Court 
level, this claim is now barred. See, McCarthy v. State, 265 P.2d 387 (Utah 
1953); Wright, Miller and Cooper, Chapter 13 at Section 4436. See also, in 
light of the Court's ultimate ruling regarding nominal damages, Utah Code 
Annotated §78-18-1, which, were the punitive damage claim presently 
allowable, would preclude substantive compensation. 
After Judge Kimball's dismissal on January 31, 2002, Appellants re-filed their 
lawsuit in Kane County on May 10, 2002. (R7). Appellants' complaint again alleged both 
negligence and breach of contract and inappropriately still sought punitive damages. 
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Appellants alleged that as a result of Appellees' actions, Appellants "were denied the 
opportunity of purchasing the property". (See Appellants' Complaint at paragraphs 5,11, 
and 19). Appellants' hypothesis, simply stated, was that had Ray Spencer bid up to the 
authorized amount of $3 5,000.00, Appellants would have been the winning bidders at the tax 
sale. 
After the state suit was filed on May 10,2002 nothing occurred until the District Court 
filed its Notice of Intent to Dismiss ten months later on March 25,2003. (R20). Thereafter, 
the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. (R52, R115). Appellants, at page 4 
of their appellate brief, abbreviate the factual basis for Appellees' Motion as follows: 
After suit was filed, the Defendants produced an Affidavit, dated February 2, 
2001, from the successful auction bidder, William C. Pringle, stating, "Had the 
bidding gone up to Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00), I have no 
doubt that I would have bid still higher on this property ...." 
This statement, however, only partially addresses the entirety of Appellants' proffered 
affidavits. Mr. Pringle's initial Affidavit submitted in support of Appellees' Motion for 
Summary Judgment was augmented by a Supplemental Affidavit. (R90, 85). The first 
Affidavit, dated February 2,2001 sets forth sixteen salient facts in reference to Mr. Pringle's 
presence at the Kane County tax sale, his knowledge of the property, and his willingness and 
ability to bid far in excess of $35,000.00 for the property. Mr. Pringle's supplemental 
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Affidavit additionally contained the following eight paragraphs: 
1. I am an adult and am personally familiar with the facts set forth 
in this Affidavit. 
2. I am presently living in Kane County, Utah. 
3. On May 11,1999,1 attended a tax sale in Kane County. On that 
day in question, I attended that sale with the specific intent and plan to purchase 
Lot 25, Plat B, Zion View Mountain Estates. 
4. Having served as a sales manager for one of the original 
developers, Tri-State Development and having at a subsequent time acquired 
a minority interest in the subdivision, I was personally familiar with Lot 25, Plat 
B, Zion View Mountain Estates and I came prepared to the sale to purchase the 
property for either my benefit or for subsequent resale. 
5. Tax sales in Kane County must be completed by the tender of 
money to the Treasurer of the County by 5:00 p.m. on the date of the bid. On 
this date in question, I had available to me, monies well in excess of Thirty-Five 
Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) to bid on Lot 25, Plat B and without any 
speculation on my part whatsoever, I was prepared to bid in excess of Thirty-
Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) to obtain this property which I felt could 
be quickly resold for approximately Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) or, 
perhaps, on terms for Sixty Thousand Dollars ($60,000.00) or more. 
6. After the sale, I was contacted by a gentleman identifying himself 
as Stephen Schwartz. Mr. Schwartz indicated that he was interested in 
purchasing the property. I advised Mr. Schwartz that my son and daughter-in-
law were co-investors which curtailed me from providing him a quick response, 
but that he should submit me a written offer for the property. No offer ever 
came. 
7. I was fully prepared to bid more than Thirty-Five Thousand 
Dollars ($35,000.00) at the time of the auction sale and had those funds 
available on the date of the auction. I have no reason to fabricate my clear 
intention in that matter which was to purchase the property for my own benefit 
and my plan to do so had been well formulated prior to the auction. 
8. I have made myself available for depositions for the Plaintiff in 
the instant case and continue to be available in Kane County. If put under oath, 
my testimony would be no different than that set forth in this affidavit. (R85). 
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Appellants had earlier contended in federal court that a similar affidavit of Mr. Pringle was 
conjectural, speculative and not capable of proof. The Honorable Ronald Boyce, United 
States Magistrate Judge, found as follows: 
Pringle's affidavit is four pages in length, and states facts for his awareness of 
the tax sale of the Front View Mountain States property. It shows his interest 
in the sale and familiarity with the property and their proximate properties. 
These items corroborate his claim of intent and what he would have done. The 
affidavit provides the basis for determining the merits of his evidence as to a 
fact at issue for the motion to dismiss. The affidavit shows a proper basis for 
consideration under Rule 602, F.R.E. and is not subject to exclusion. (R72-71; 
see also Addendum 2, 3). 
Yet a third affidavit of Mr. Pringle was filed on May 14,2003. Mr. Pringle, once again, set 
forth his ability and intent to bid more than $35,000.00 to obtain the property at the tax sale 
and his continuing availability for depositions. (Rl 18-117, ^[18, 19). 
In opposing summary judgment in 2003, Appellants filed a reply memorandum 
(R170). Exhibit " 1 " to that reply memorandum was an Affidavit of Stephen Schwartz 
wherein in paragraph 11 thereof, Schwartz recited the following hearsay: 
On May 24,19991 spoke with William Pringle. He told me that he would not 
have bid more than $20,000.00 for the property, that he had only brought 
$30,000.00 to the auction and that he had anticipated bidding on other 
properties (Mr. Pringle did buy another property at that auction). He refused 
to entertain an offer to purchase the property telling me that he had decided to 
'keep it in the family5. 
(See, Rl 56). Additionally as Exhibit 3B to Appellants' Reply Memorandum, Mr. Schwartz 
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produced an alleged transcript of a conversation with William Pringle dated one month later 
on June 21, 1999. (R150-133). This hearsay "transcript" at R150-R133 is also 
incongruously an addendum to Appellants' Brief. Appellants argued to the Utah District 
Court that Pringle's three filed Affidavits were potentially in conflict with the taped phone 
call, relying on a single telephonic statement allegedly attributed to Pringle: 
WP: I am trying to tell you, you know I might have said well, I was going to 
quit at 20. But I don't think I would have. I had the money. And I had 
the credit line that I could convert in a few hours, you know. 
(See, R138, R167-166). Notably, in 1999 "Pringle" conceded to Appellant, Schwartz that 
he was already seventy-two (72) years old. (R134-135).1 
Judge Mower scheduled oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment 
on December 4,2003. (Rl 94, R209). The Court heard the matter on December 22,2003 and 
approximately five (5) months later on June 2,2003, Appellees filed a Notice to Submit for 
Decision. (R209, R213). On July 1, 2004, Judge Mower received a memorandum from his 
law clerk advising the judge as follows: 
While it would appear that the statements plaintiff seeks to introduce would be 
hearsay,UTAH R. EVID. rule 801(d)(1)(A) provides prior inconsistent statements 
are admissible both for impeachment and as substantive evidence. Further, "In 
While Appellants refer to this telephonic conversation, it cannot be gainsaid that the same would be inadmissible hearsay unless 
Mr Pnngle were otherwise called as a witness Several times throughout the conversation, Pnngle insists to Mr Schwartz that Pringle would have 
bid well more than $35,000 00 for the property and that a bid of $35,000 00 on Appellants' behalf would not have beena prevailing bid at the tax 
sale m Kane County m reference to the particular property (R149, 148, 146, 137). 
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Utah, any prior witness statement that is inconsistent with the witness's 
testimony . . . is admissible as nonhearsay evidence if the witness testifies at 
trial and the evidence is offered while the witness is still available to explain 
the inconsistency." EDWARD KIMBALL AND RONALD BOYCE, UTAH EVIDENCE 
LAW ART. Vm, at 8-287 (2d ed. 2004). (R217). 
Twenty-six (26) days later, Judge Mower's initial ruling denied Appellees' motion stating 
that as Pringle's statements were contradictory "plaintiff should have the opportunity to try 
to elicit them from Mr. Pringle at trial [as a witness]. The statements would not be hearsay 
because of Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah R. Evid". (R219). The foregoing facts are recited with 
great accuracy by paragraphs 7-20 of the District Court's final opinion. (See Addendum " 1" 
attached hereto; R468-465) 
From May 1999 to the present, however, Appellants never deposed William Pringle. 
In December 2004, however, Appellees deposed William Pringle's son, Bryan Pringle. 
(R474; R324-239). The thrust of Bryan Pringle's deposition, is set forth in paragraphs 21 -28 
of the District Court's findings: 
21. After the July 2004 Order was entered, Defendants took the 
deposition of Mr. Bryan Pringle in December of 2004. Mr. Bryan Pringle 
testified in his deposition that after Mr. William Pringle filed his last Affidavit 
in the Spring of 2003, Mr. William Pringle suffered a cortical stroke on July 
10, 2003, which stroke was unknown to the parties and this Court in July of 
2004. There is no verified testimony, whatsoever, in opposition to this 
statement. 
22. Mr. Bryan Pringle further testified that his father presently has 
no recollection, whatsoever, of 1999, and cannot remember within one hour 
-13-
of eating lunch whether he has in fact eaten lunch or what he ate. 
23. Mr. Bryan Pringle further stated that his father's mental and 
physical health is so compromised by his cortical stroke in July 2003, that Mr. 
William Pringle now remains primarily confined to his home in Sun City, 
Arizona. 
24. At the telephonic hearing on June 3,2005, three days before the 
scheduled trial, the Court further confirmed that the Plaintiffs did not have Mr. 
William Pringle available for trial nor did they intend to call him for trial. No 
deposition of William Pringle was ever taken or memorialized since 1999 in 
reference to this case. 
2 5. Mr. Bryan Pringle further testified that he also was familiar with 
the property in question and that two to three weeks prior to the tax sale in 
1999, Mr. Bryan Pringle and his father, Mr. William Pringle, agreed to joint 
venture the purchase of the real property, believing they could obtain 
$50,000.00 or more upon resale of the lot. 
26. Mr. Bryan Pringle further testified that, even had Defendants bid 
up to Plaintiffs' $35,000.00 bid limit, as authorized by Plaintiffs, that William 
Pringle, as agent for the joint venture, would have bid a higher amount for the 
property. 
27. Mr. Bryan Pringle further testified that he and his father had 
received an offer to sell the property for what he recalled was $32,000.00 
shortly after the tax purchase and that they were not interested in selling the 
property even for the sum of $40,000.00 immediately after the sale. 
28. Mr. Bryan Pringle further testified that his father had 
approximately $100,000.00 available on the date of the tax sale to use toward 
the purchase of the property, if necessary, and that in no event would a bid 
$35,000.00 on behalf of Plaintiffs prevailed at the tax sale in reference to the 
particular real property in question. (See, Addendum " 1 " ; R465-463). 
On June 3, 2005 Appellants conceded to Judge Mower that they "did not have Mr. Pringle 
available for trial nor did they [appellants] intend to call him for trial". Id. at [^24. The 
District Court further noted that no deposition of William Pringle was ever taken or 
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memorialized since 1999 in reference to this case. Id. at f 24. 
As William Pringle would never be a witness at trial, Rule 801, Utah R.Evid, allowing 
for the admissibility of prior contradictory statements of a witness was conclusively 
inapplicable. Similarly, the initial ruling of the District Court contemplating that Appellants 
would pursue William Pringle's testimony as a witness no longer applied. (R219; cf. R464, 
119,24). 
Bryan Pringle's deposition is found in the record both at R474 and R322 - 239. A tax 
deed attached as Exhibit" 1" to Mr. Bryan Pringle's deposition shows that William and Bryan 
Pringle and their wives jointly took title to the property. (R258). Appellees, in light of Bryan 
Pringle's deposition, renewed their Motion for Summary Judgment on April 25, 2005. 
(R381). Appellants contended that Bryan Pringle's involvement in the property was after 
the fact, but Appellants' contention is belied by Appellant Schwartz' own affidavit indicating 
that Mr. William Pringle in May of 1999 refused to entertain an offer to purchase the subject 
property by advising Appellant, Stephen Schwartz, that he had decided to "keep it in the 
family". (R156, paragraph 11). 
On June 3, 2005, the District Court Judge specifically inquired whether Appellants 
would call Mr. William Pringle at trial. Before the District Court were not only the multiple 
affidavits of William Pringle, but the sworn testimony of Bryan Pringle, taken in Nevada. 
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1 he (. ourt, confirming : ; 4 ;VIM. r ; • -/*\ • : * -*1 ' " A, had 
never taken his deposition, and would not be calling him as a witness, found for Appellees 
on the issue of causation and damage calculation pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah R.Civ. 
Appellants had produced nothing dispositive .;; ,; . a n i b - j : , IM\ 
Pringle iair.-. :n u IrJ l«" iliiiiuir, Appellees foncvilt/nl bnfh negligence and breach of 
enntrar while simultaneously stating that despite these failures, there was no causation in 
reference to Appellants' claim for damages in the first instance and that t;.v lamage 
calculation, if any, w o i . . ; . v , ^ , . . . - . • . •• -.-. . ec- •*:•'• 
v . ;.v.! . t _ :•. , !" ;v- /* liiidin Prip^I:' would h a \ c outbid Appellees and 
been the prevailing bidder at any price between $11,250.00 and $35,000.00. 
S U M M A R Y OF A R G U M E N T S 
ISS UE NO, I *• • 
A ppellants to prevail on a cause of action framed either in tort or contract must prove 
the element of causation, to-wit: that cause "which in the natural and continuous sequence 
produces the injury and w i; iuu: a nu .• A\C >,- » r< ^ce "I hurston 
v. Worker 's Comp. i »ii... :' ; Utah Ct. App. 2003). Appellants herein failed to 
contravene substantial dispositive evidence which demonstrated that even had Appellees 
fully complied with Appellants' written instructions, Appellants v\ oi. ,t ii-^ i : .a \ , v . :• , ;e 
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prevailing bidders at the tax sale in Kane County in 1999, and no different result would have 
ensued. 
ISSUE NO. II 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah R. Civ. P. specifies that in opposing summary judgments 
Appellants must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Those facts 
as a matter of law cannot be based upon hearsay, which hearsay Appellants attempted to rely 
on before the District Court and have inappropriately resurrected on appeal. 
ISSUE NO. Ill 
Appellants characterize Mr. William Pringle as a witness. This characterization is 
inappropriate as William Pringle is not only unavailable for trial, but Appellants further 
conceded he would not be called for trial. Insofar as Appellants failed to take the deposition 
of Mr. William Pringle for a period in excess of four years when Mr. William Pringle was 
available for deposition and lucid, Appellants have now placed themselves in a situation 
where Mr. Pringle's testimony is reduced to his dispositive affidavits and not countered by 
alleged hearsay declarations. The admissibility of William Pringle's prior statements which 
Appellants argue are inconsistent, requires first that Mr. Pringle be called as a witness. See 
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) Utah R. Evid. 
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I S S U E N O . IV • 
A p p e l l a t e . -• an the burden of causat ion, request that the Court of 
Appeals create an inroad b y s imply first presuming causali ty and secondly p resuming what 
Appel lan ts ' successful b id would ha \ c been ,.-.aa, ,^\ ,-:. ,-ti,.a:.-. eaic- . 
hypothesis is eoiiira>\ |. »ex i t i ng I lull \^\. [hurs ton \ , Worker ' s C o m p . Fund, 83 P.3d 391 
(I liiili ( t \ | i p _ \,ni: , 
ISSUE M X V 
The Cour t ' s conclusions of l aw in the instant cuse shoi. I«1 hi: iv\ iewed for correctness. 
A p p e l h . . . ; . . _ .. .. :- •• ! ! anerit of their claim except when a matter or issue 
falls within the purview of "common knowledge". Se_e Newman v. Sonnenberg, 81 i . v. V. 3 
(Utah Ct. App. 2003). The intervention of anon-party ana ..-•.:. .a , ' ar-aiy, 
intent and economic strength al a lav sale f- M-H L mum \ \cAnc. 
ISSUE NO. VI 
Appellants were given a period in excess of seven months to pose any objections U> 
the Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw, and Ninmui \ nnfejueni i uhmi i i cd to the District 
Court. Appel lants failed u > 1 ilr :m\ < »hjiv1 ion whatsoever pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the U tah 
1" i11 oi \ \ f ( ii vil Procedure . As a consequence thereof, Appel lants have waived any objections 
to the j u d g m e n t before the Court of Appeals . See 438 M a m Street v. Easy Street Inc., 99 
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P.3d 801 (Utah 2004). 
ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE NO. I 
There Is No Causal Nexus for Appellants' Claim for Damages; 
Damage Calculation Would Be Purely Conjectural 
Appellees introduced, through numerous affidavits, the testimony of William Pringle 
and Mr. Pringle's affidavits established both his extensive familiarity with the property and 
his desire, willingness, and ability to bid for the same well in excess of $35,000.00 at the tax 
sale. (R90, 85,118). Appellant Schwartz filed his own affidavit in 2003 which, by hearsay, 
indicated that Mr. Pringle had telephonically advised Appellants in May of 1999 to the 
contrary. (R156). Appellants then additionally submitted an alleged transcript of a 
subsequently taped telephonic conversation from June of 1999 which Appellants claimed 
contradicted William Pringle's Affidavits. (R156,150-133). Judge Mower initially denied 
Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment and noted that Appellants might elicit testimony 
from Mr. Pringle as a witness, and pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Utah R. Evid. bring 
in through examination these potentially conflictive declarations. (R220-219). 
After Bryan Pringle's December 2004 deposition, Appellees renewed their summary 
judgment motion. (R381). In June of 2005, the District Court was apprised that William 
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Pringle had suffered a cortical stroke on h. .
 r * _ • -. • * .;!*.! •*'* • 
and remained m a compromised men : * • ' J* \ri/uiia. Thereafter, Judge Mower 
ci >n tinned \\ i1h Appellants that William Pringle was not going to be a witness. (R464, ^\2A). 
For a period of over four (4) years, despite ample opportunity to depose Mr. \\ llliam 
Pringle, Appellants, one a licensed attorney, proceeded \vi (h I ideal ion witJ M >LI! memorializing 
William Fringle's testimony. 
Bryan Pringle, m December 2004, testified to his father's medical and mental 
condition and further stated that he and his father had mutually decided that the proper! \ w as 
worthatleast$50,000.0(lutlhetinieol lU tax sak\<R30(>-3(H: ^12^07 ?86-283; 265-261) 
Bt\an Pringle cunfinned f!i,il (lie Pnngles would have bid in excess of $35,000.00 to obtain 
the property. Id. Bryan Pringle further confirmed that William Pringle had sufficient funds 
to complete the transaction for a price up ti. • - - : . /. ].. ^ •• - 1 
In Hunsaker v. State, x ;. " .i ; / : 1C Utah Supreme Court stated 
., i egligence claim, Plaintiff must establish four essential elements i (1) that 
the Defendant owed the Plaintiff a duty, (2) that the Defendant breached that dul \, \ 3 I that 
the breach of duty was the proximate caus^ < :!K Plaintiffs injur} ., and (A) that the Plaintiff 
in tact suffered injur, <i il linages . aicumstances where the proximate cause of an 
. • left to conjecture, Plaintiffs negligence claim must fail as a matter of law. Sumsion 
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v.Streator-SmithJnc, 132 P.2d 680,683 (Utah 1943) (cited in Thurston v. Workers Comp., 
83 P.3d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 2003)). Ultimately, proximate cause is "that cause which in the 
natural and continuous sequence (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the 
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause - - the 
one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury". Thurston 83 
P.3d at 395 (citing Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999)). 
As further stated in the Thurston case: 
Essentially the same analysis applies to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims. 
. . . Although Plaintiffs argue that "proximate cause is not an element of a 
breach of contract claim," Utah law holds that Plaintiffs can only recover 
"general damages, which flow naturally from the breach and consequential 
damages, which, while not an invariable result of breach, were reasonably 
foreseeable by the parties at the time the contract was entered into. 
Id. at 397 (citing Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 939 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997). 
The Thurston Court later states as follows: 
Categorizing some of those acts as contract breaches does not eliminate the 
need to establish a causal connection. Defendants' acts, whether for breaches 
of contract or torts, must be casually linked to Plaintiffs' damages. As Corbin 
explains, 
damages are not recoverable for injury that is to remote from the 
conduct of the Defendant constituting his breach of duty . . . 
[DJamages are not recoverable for losses suffered . . . unless the 
requirements of the law as to 'proximate' causation are 
satisfied. The form of this rule is the same whether it is being 
applied in the field of contracts or in the field of torts. 
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Id. (Emphasis added). 
Again,, w hen r;msalii m "is left 1o conjecture, the plaintiff must fail as a matter of law." 
Id. (citing M a h m o o d v. Ross . 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999)). 
In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaidthai Mi ^ • .. • r n n g k \\a* ah :iiu.:\ ening 
actor in the p resen t : : : ..i . ;s • } :-< -•-:-.- • ••«••. . •- •: i in tort. 
William Priiigle's three affidavits all state that had Appellees continued bidding as per 
Appellants ' directive up to $35,000.00 , Appellants \\ ould •••111 have not prevailed at the tax 
sale. (R90, 85, I I S ) T- T v , . . ... , - ; , : . . . ,
 :... • >t 
Appeii ;;... - • ** »in Mr. Wil l iamPringle at trial. 
.
 p -., ^ j ^ order presumed the continuing health, mental acumen, and availability for trial 
of Mr. Will iam Pringle, who unknown to all parties, had already suffered a cortical stroke. 
(R219; cf R306-303) . 
I\ Ir. Bi yan I ;,i ingle 's testii noriy is neither speculative nor does it invite conjecture. In 
his deposition, he clearly testifies that he and his father discussed the purchase of the 
property weeks before the tax sale and that a l id <>.:*. • 
i;n. . ;.w ''• ^ ^ "'i"r .Mem1, non confirming ± a i 
-•• " iiad nothing but conjecture and hearsay to contradict Bryan Pringle5s testimony 
and the affidavits of Wil l iam Pringle, summaryjudgment was appropriate unuci K u le>; ^ . ) 
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and (e) Utah R.Civ.P. Appellants' argument that Bryan Pringle was mistaken or not credible 
is simply argument and not in compliance with Rule 56 prerequisites to oppose summary 
judgment. Appellants' arguments that but for the contractual breach or the tortuous conduct 
of Appellees, Appellants would have been the prevailing purchasers for a bid somewhere 
between $11,250.00 and $35,000.00 at the time of the tax sale must fail; they are pure 
conjecture. Under these circumstances, Appellants' case "must fail as a matter of law" and 
by way of summary judgment. Thurston, 83 P.3d at 395. (citing Sumsionv. Streator- Smith, 
Inc., 132 P.2d 680, 683 (Utah 1943)). 
ISSUE NO, II 
Appellants Provided No Admissible Evidence to Specifically Oppose 
Appellees' Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment on the Issue of Causation 
Six years after the 1999 tax sale in June 2005, Appellees' Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment came before the District Court, bottomed on three affidavits of William 
Pringle and the sworn testimony of Bryan Pringle. (See, R322). Rule 56(e), Utah R.Civ.P., 
provides that opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge and shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible into evidence and show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify as to the matters stated therein, supplemented by depositions or answers 
to interrogatories. In 2005 Appellants merely indicated that they had no way "of knowing 
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or detei i i lining the status of William I "i ingle 's sta te of health oi ability to recollect pi ioi 
events today". (R397at^ . . Appellants then attempted to impugn the inteLTrin* ^TR^yan 
Pringle5 s deposition by indicating that "[t]he statements and affidavits of Wm. [sic] Pringle 
make no mention oi i > - : i m^e i R.v'.,, *_;.,; vppeliants5 contention, however, is 
belied by W illia xii : °.~- * .* ' :. • • t .
 )% ..,-. earlier 
wherein paragraph 16 states as follows: 
Some time after the sale, in May 1999,1 was contacted by a gentleman who 
identified himself as Stephen Schwartz. Mr. Schwartz told me that he was 
interested in purchasing the property and indicated he would offer me Thirty 
Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) for the same. I advised Mr. Schwartz that my 
son and daughter-in-law were co-investors which curtailed me from providing 
him a quick response, but that he should submit me a written offer for the Real 
Property. 
(R1181J16; see also, R8416). 
Though inadmissible as evidence, Appellant Schwartz hearsay transcript ol an 
Pringle's involvement on lines 14 through 15 of Page 1 of that "transcribed" conversation: 
WP: I sort of let the family know. And they don't want to sell it, 
1 hereafter, Appellant Schv • ai tz indicated: 
SS: Well I don't oiame them . . . No, I don't blame them at all. 
To winch, Mr. Pringle thereafter replies: 
24 
WP: Yeah. They sort of want to hold onto it. 
(R150). 
Bryan Pringle's deposition clearly sets forth that his father could not attend trial or be 
of further help to the District Court. (R306-305). Appellants had done nothing since 1999 
to dispose Mr. William Pringle to contradict the affidavits of this Arizona resident. 
Appellants conceded to the District Court that a conclusive determination that William 
Pringle would have bid in excess of $35,000.00 at the May 20, 1999 auction would provide 
a basis for summary judgment. (R391). Appellants thereafter submitted, however, that 
Appellees' assertions based upon the Affidavits of William Pringle and the deposition of 
BryanPringle, were "speculative andunverifiable". (R391: lines 15-18). Similar arguments 
that the Pringles' testimony was speculative and unverifiable were also rej ected by the United 
States Magistrate Judge, Ronald Boyce, years earlier. (R72-71). Under these circumstances, 
Judge Mower, based on the affidavits of William Pringle and the sworn deposition testimony 
of Bryan Pringle, properly entered summary judgment, finding that while there had been a 
breach of contract and the commission of a tort, Appellants could not prevail on either theory 
to establish the significant causal connection for damages, or, to establish a basis to 
determine the amount of damage sustained, if any. Indeed, the District Court lacked any 
evidence appropriately suggesting that somewhere between $ 11,250.00 and $35,000.00 Mr. 
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William Pringlew ouldha\ e ceased bidding allow ing Appellants to be the successful bidders. 
The District Court's position comports with well established Utah Law. See Walker 
v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274; 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973); Western 
States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Bloomquist 29 Utah \ i -. - 1 , . . v> 
JUUUL' iMMHi^  , . . . iJi.ii Collection i ru.Vi \ . i iarris, v: ! • 
The party proposing summary judgment has the duty to "set forth specific facts 
showing there is a genuine issue for tri.i *. ah K.Civ.P. 56(e). "[B]are 
contentions unsupported by any specification of facts in support thereof, raise 
no material questions of fact as will preclude entry of summary judgment". 
Id, at 597 (quoting Massev v. Utah Power and Light, 609 P 2d 937, 938 (I Jtah 1980)). 
Sir \unriu,s ,. .n...,.,: M 199 7, 1003 (I ] 1 i ih 2002) Ji ist ice Wilkins, speaking 
for the Utah Supreme Court, stated the principal as follows: 
To overcome summary judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavit or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e). "If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." 
Appellants herein bore the burden of proof on causation whether their theory is 
bottomed in contract or tort. \ eviiicd uici * *-<\<- . \w. •: -: . . . . . UKMIM.CVI • ,u . > m 
had A ppellees fully complied vv ith theii obligations to A ppellants, A ppellants, nonetheless, 
would not have been the prevailing purchasers at the tax sale. Appellants provided no 
admissible evidence specifically contrary to the dispositive Affidavits of William Pringle and 
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the sworn testimony of his son, Bryan Pringle. Given six years to conduct discovery on the 
case to establish causation, Appellants case failed on this pre-requisite nexus. And, when 
causation is left to conjecture, Appellants' case fails as a matter of law whether framed in tort 
or in contract. See Hunsaker v. State. 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993); Thurston v. Workers 
Comp. Fund. 83 P.3d 391 at 397 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
ISSUE NO HI 
Appellants' Present Characterization of William Pringle as a Witness for 
Purposes of Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence Is Untenable 
Appellants in June of 2005 advised Judge Mower that Appellants did not have Mr. 
William Pringle available for the upcoming trial. (R464, f 24). Consequently, the District 
Court appropriately concluded that Appellants recitation of a May 1999 telephone conference 
with Mr. Pringle as well as the unverified transcript of a tape recorded conversation with Mr. 
Pringle would not be admissible. (Rule 801 of the Utah R.Evid; R465,1J20). The District 
Court's ruling excluding consideration of these hearsay statements under Rule 56(e) of the 
Utah R. Civ. P. should only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 
Chen v. Stewart, 123 P.3d 416, 425 (Utah 2005). 
In the instant case, the Findings of Fact of the District Court were fomented by the 
Affidavits of William Pringle and the deposition of Bryan Pringle. By specific inquiry to Mr. 
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Schwartz, tin. i^sL .. : o a rt inquired . . ; . i 
wiines>au" ' '• - : --, i:-i. •< \ un that Mr. Pringle was neither under subpoena 
for trial nor would be called as a witness by Appellants. (R464, ^24). This being the case, 
the introduction, if any, of Mr. Pringle's prior statements pursuant , ae . \..,i e 
hearsayrulecreated lor witnessesi- - o ••' • - x- . w\ \y\ Appellants' 
ahuitv William Pringle's deposition was never taken for a period in excess of six (6) years 
at the time 'the matter was scheduled for trial. Insofar as .Appellants conceded that Mr. 
William Pringle would not be called as a w uness. UK cvjqv, 
have allowed foi tl le admissibility of prior inconsistent statements of the declarant was no 
longer available to Appellants. 
On pa^c 5 ,>f Appellants' brief, Appellants once again reassert these macnia-. >. 
hearsay statements to tlu la;. . \:yv....- •'- ' •• : .it 
After Defendants produced the Affidavit of William C. Pringle, Plaintiffs 
produced the Affidavit of Stephen H. Schwartz, dated August 27, 2003, 
averring that "on May 24, 1999 I spoke with William Pringle. He told me that 
he would not have bid more than $20,000.00 for the property, that he had only 
brought $30,000.00 to the auction and that he had anticipated bidding on other 
properties." 
It cannot be gainsaid tli.il lias statement of Appellant Schwartz, gleaned from Mr. Schwartz's 
own Affidavit and attributed to William Pringle is a hearsay declaration attributed to a non-
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party and would be admissible only through examination of the original declarant. 
Nonetheless, Appellants continue to assert this hearsay before the Utah Court of Appeals 
which violates Rule 56(e) Utah R. Civ P. As set forth by Judge Bench in Panos v. Olsen & 
Associates Const., Inc.. 123 P.3d 816, 818 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 2005): 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to 
file such a response. Utah R. Civ.P. 56(e) (emphasis added). To defeat a 
motion for summary judgment, the allegations contained in the pleadings must 
be "admissible in evidence." Id. This evidence may be submitted in the form 
of "depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits," thereby 
"showing that there is a genuine issue for trial". Id. Statements that are "not 
. . . admissible in evidence . . . may not be considered on summary judgment 
under Rule 56(e)." Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). 
Appellants also appended to their brief the alleged transcript of a telephone 
conversation with William Pringle on June 21,1999, isolating and incorrectly reciting from 
this hearsay conversation a single statement attributed to this non-witness. Appellants 
contend to the Utah Court of Appeals that Pringle stated, "I might have said you know, I was 
going to quit at 20." (AB at 5). The entirety of the hearsay quote attributed to William 
Pringle, however, is as follows: 
WP: I'm trying to tell you, you know I might have said well, I was going to 
quit at 20. But I don't think I would have. I had the money. And I had the 
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credit line that I could convert in a few hours, you know. (R138). 
Furthermore, even were the entirety of Appellants' taped hearsay conversation with 
Mr. Pringle somehow admissible, Appellants' case would still fail nonetheless. Appellant 
Schwartz's alleged transcript of the June conversation with Mr. Pringle provides the 
following: 
SS: I know. Well I did get after their butts because at that time you said to 
me that you would have stopped bidding at $20,000.00. 
WP: No. I never said that. 
SS: Okay. Then I misunderstood what you said. 
WP: No. No. I know you know I know what that lot's worth. I had 30 grand in the 
bank at the time and eight credit cards in my pocket with about $8000 limit 
each. I don't think I would have quit there, buddy. At $20,000? 
SS: You don't think so. 
WP: Nooo. 
(R149). 
WP: Oh. I would have went 30,000 real boldly and then maybe slowed down like 
Ray did, just starting bidding 200 at a time, instead of 800 or 1000 a time like 
I did. Too bad you don't have a recording of that. Really. He let it go twice 
a couple of times. 
(R148). 
Furthermore, at R146 Mr. Pringle again confirmed that had Appellees continued to bid up 
to the bidding limit authorized by Appellants, to-wit: $35,000.00, the bidding would have 
gone yet higher. At R146, line 23 William Pringle stated as follows: "Well, I'll guarantee, 
I will betcha you and I would have ended up 35 to 40." 
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At R137 and R136 once again the inadmissible hearsay attributed to William Pringle 
demonstrates that despite Appellants' plea that Pringle somehow concede that he would have 
stopped bidding at $20,000.00, Pringle never makes this concession. 
Appellants' renewed assertions in Appellants' brief relying on this "transcript" are 
wholly inappropriate. Indeed, Appellants, before the District Court as well as on appeal, 
have failed to marshal any admissible evidence, whatsoever, to counter the dispositive 
affidavits of William Pringle and the deposition testimony of Bryan Pringle. In granting 
summary judgment in the instant case, the District Court had before it three (3) affidavits 
from William Pringle, the prevailing bidder at the tax sale together with the sworn deposition 
of William Pringle's son, Bryan Pringle. Appellants, nonetheless, characterize the District 
Court's conclusions as being fomented on a single sworn statement "of the witness, William 
C. Pringle, signed two years after the sale". ( See AB at 13). Appellants then contend that 
Mr. Pringle's "statement" as recited by Stephen Schwartz in Schwartz' Affidavit and the 
transcripted telephone conversation of June 1999 remain admissible pursuant to Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) Utah R. Evid. Appellants' argument verbatim is as follows: 
In the case under consideration, the court below determined that a sworn 
statement of the witness, William C. Pringle, signed two years after the sale, 
that he would have bid more than the Defendants were authorized to bid 
conclusive as to the issue of causation. In granting summary judgment, the 
lower court of necessity had to find that facts and inferences supporting the 
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plaintiffs' claim did not rise to the level of materiality. 
The sworn statement of the Plaintiff that the witness, William C. Pringle had 
told him only five days after the auction he had taken only $30,000.00 to the 
auction and that he would have bid only $20,000.00 on the property, [sic] The 
statements are admissible as both prior inconsistent statements and, if the 
witness appears to testify, substitute evidence. Utah R. Evid., Rule 801(d)(1). 
(ABatl3). 
In his initial denial of summary judgment, Judge Mower indicated that Appellants 
should be allowed to elicit contrary testimony from Mr. Pringle as a witness. In the six years 
between the tax sale and the trial setting, Appellants had never deposed William Pringle. 
Ultimately, Appellants' reliance on Rule 801(d)(1), Utah R. Evid. is misplaced. Rule 
801(d)(1), Utah R. Evid. states as follows: 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(l)Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross examination concerning the statement 
and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or 
the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten . . . 
It is significant to note that the District Court had continued the summary judgment 
at an earlier junction specifically to allow Appellants to develop Mr. Pringle's testimony at 
trial. (R465, at fl9). Finding of Fact paragraph 24, entered by the District Court Judge, 
ultimately, sets forth the following and is not challenged by Appellants: 
24. At the telephonic hearing on June 3, 2005, three days before the 
scheduled trial, the Court further confirmed that the Plaintiffs [Appellants] did 
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not have Mr. William Pringle available for trial nor did they intend to call him 
for trial. No deposition of William Pringle was ever taken or memorialized 
since 1999 in reference to this case. 
Appellants have not challenged the above Finding of Fact. Insofar as William Pringle would 
never be a witness, it is oxymoronic for Appellants to now argue that these alleged contrary 
statements allegedly made by William Pringle somehow remain admissible pursuant to Rule 
801 (d)( 1 )(A), Utah R. Evid. Indeed, not deposed nor available for trial, Appellants conceded 
that William Pringle would not be a witness. Appellants' arguments that this hearsay of a 
non-witness remains admissible violates Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Utah R. Evid. and is 
misplaced. 
Appellants earlier maintained their case on the supposition that William Pringle, if 
called as a witness, would somehow recant his dispositive affidavits. Appellants continue 
to argue that the Court of Appeals should accept Appellants' hearsay as precluding the entry 
of summary judgment. This argument is not only contrary to Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ.P. and 
Rule 801, Utah R. Evid., but, frankly, approaches a juncture wherein Appellants' argument 
maybe taken as a blatant expression of bad faith and otherwise entitle Appellees to attorneys 
fees. See, e.g. Nipper v. Douglas, 90 P.3d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)2. 
2 
Appellants, relying on an addendum recite to the Court on page 5 of their Brief that the records of Kane County showed 
"that in 17 other auctions other than the one at issue, Mr. Pringle had never bid in excess of $5,250.00 or of the 'market value' of 
the property auctioned (the market value of the subject property was $8,349.00 on the date of the auction). . ." Notably, however, 
the District Court as well as this Court must deal with the subject property, a unique parcel with which Mr. William Pringle was well 
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Indeed, Utah case law has addressed this argument as early as 1960 in the case of 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham. 10 Utah 2d 329; 353 P.2d 168 Utah (1960). 
Therein, Justice Henroid set forth the following salutatory proposition concerning the pre-
trial discovery and the interpretation of Rule 56? Utah R. Civ.P., with all Justices concurring: 
Under Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, having to do with summary 
judgment, the facts pleaded in the counterclaim created a situation something 
akin to a presumption that disappears on production of indisputable or 
admitted antithetical facts. The rule permits an excursion beyond the pleading. 
If facts discovered in the journey irrefutably disprove facts pleaded, summary 
judgment is appropriate on motion therefor. The rule has been interpreted 
more articulately by eminent authorities on the subject who suggest that the 
rule permits us to pierce the pleading, resulting in summary judgment, if an 
examination of facts developed under the discovery procedure, by affidavit, 
deposition, admission and the like, makes it appear that no genuine issue of 
fact is presentable. To travel beyond that point would be a waste of time, 
energy and cost. The rule designedly seeks to eliminate protraction, absent 
issues of fact, expediting litigation in an area where possible congested 
calendars point up the truism that justice delayed is justice denied. 
Id. At 322. 
Similarly, Appellants' pleadings contend that Appellees' failure to follow Appellants' 
bidding instructions caused Appellants to lose the purchase of the property. Appellants' 
complaint bears with it the very essential burden of causation; the evidence developed in the 
acquainted having been both a sales manager and developer of the subject property. The thrust of Appellants inference is lost in the 
sheer fact that in the instant case Pringle's prevailing bid was already approximately $3,000.00 over the assessed valuation of the 
subject property. Clearly, Appellants have confused the concept of market value with assessed value. Both William Pringle and 
his son, Bryan, put the market value on the property at the time of sale at approximately $50,000.00 and both the Affidavits of 
William Pringle and the deposition of Bryan Pringle indicated that a bid of $35,000.00 would not have been the prevailing bid on 
this specific rim lot in this subdivision 
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case contravenes this factual prerequisite. This matter parallels that situation referenced in 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. Id. 
ISSUE NO. IV 
Appellants' Arguments Seeking To Shift the Burden of 
Proof in Both Tort and Contract Law Are Legally Untenable. 
In Point I of Appellants' Brief, Appellants take the following position: 
Plaintiffs (Appellants) urge this Court to find that the lower Court erred in 
placing the burden of proof as to what the sales price would have been upon 
the Plaintiff in this case because the very uncertainty in this regard was caused 
by the wrongful act of Defendants. 
(ABatlO). 
This hypothesis, however, is directly contrary to the factual Affidavits of William Pringle and 
the testimony of his son, Bryan Pringle. Appellees have succinctly stated in Issue I, supra, 
that either in contract or in tort, Appellants bear the burden of establishing a significant 
causal nexus between the wrong committed and the alleged harm suffered. In the instant 
case, Appellants had ample opportunity to depose William Pringle and memorialize his 
testimony. Appellees interviewed William Pringle and appropriately filed, first in Federal 
Court and later in the Utah District Court, Affidavits of William Pringle disclosing that even 
had Appellees bid up to $3 5,000.00 on the property, Appellants still would not have been the 
prevailing purchasers at the tax sale. Appellants now contend that Appellees desire to hide 
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behind the uncertainties inherent in the situation, but it is Appellees who brought certainty 
and clarity to the same. 
Indeed, in the Federal District Court, Appellants initially sought to exclude an 
affidavit of William Pringle, but Judge Boyce found that Mr. Pringle's Affidavit was clearly 
admissible. (R72-71). Furthermore, in December 2004, at the deposition of Bryan Pringle, 
Appellants examined the deponent's driver's license and other identifying documents to 
confirm Mr. Bryan Pringle's identity. William Pringle's affidavits and Bryan Pringle's 
deposition conclusively establish that a bid of $35,000.00 on Appellants' behalf for the 
property would have achieved no different result, to-wit: Appellants would still not have 
been the prevailing purchasers at the tax sale. Appellants cannot establish a causal nexus 
between the wrong committed and any damages or the amount of damages suffered. 
Dispositive admissible evidence demonstrates otherwise. 
Ultimately, to overcome this evidentiary failing, Appellants have requested that the 
Utah Court of Appeals remand this matter to the District Court "with instructions that the 
District Court grant Plaintiffs a presumption that had the Appellees not tortuously breached 
their contract with Plaintiffs that the Plaintiffs would have successfully purchased the 
property at the next bidding increment". (AB at 11). Appellants' request in this regard seeks 
to alter the law of contract and tort and is tortuous. Appellants, unable to establish the 
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prerequisite causal nexus now request the Court of Appeals to clear this evidentiary hurdle 
by sheer presumption, apparently requesting that the "presumption" also be irrebuttable. This 
proposition, however, would necessarily decimate Rule 56, Utah R. Civ. P. by conclusively 
negating William Pringle's affidavits and the deposition testimony of his son, Bryan Pringle. 
At best, presumptions are rebuttable except in the most limited of circumstances. Those 
circumstances are certainly nonexistent in the instant case. 
The second point of Appellants' Brief that substantial evidence existed from which 
a jury could infer facts contrary to the dispositive affidavits of William Pringle and the 
testimony of his son, Bryan Pringle, is similarly without foundation. In Utah, land is unique. 
Appellants tried to infer from William Pringle's bidding behaviors on other properties, that 
William Pringle would not have bid as he and his son testified on the specific property in 
question. William Pringle in the instant case already bid in excess of the property's assessed 
valuation. As the prior sales manager and developer of the subject property, Mr. Pringle was 
acutely aware at the time of sale that the property's value exceeded $50,000.00. (R90, 85, 
118). William Pringle indicated that he was both disposed and able to bid in excess of 
$35,000.00 for the property. Id Even in the June 1999 hearsay conversation, William 
Pringle "guarantees" to Stephen Schwartz, that had Schwartz bid up to $35,000.00 on the 
property, that the price still would have gone higher. (R146, Line 23). Appellants conceded 
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that their agent, Ray Spencer, did not follow Appellants' contractual instructions. Appellees, 
however, properly determined that Mr. Spencer's error had caused Appellants no harm. In 
light of William Pringle's affidavits and the deposition of Bryan Pringle, Appellants' claim 
of evidentiary uncertainty is either ill-conceived or feigned. 
ISSUE NO. V 
Reviewed for Correctness the District Court's Legal Conclusions 
Are Sustainable as a Matter of Law. 
Judge Mower in the instant case ultimately made the following eleven conclusions of 
law: 
1. Whether Plaintiffs frame their cause of action in contract or in 
tort, Utah law requires that Plaintiffs must establish a significant causal nexus 
between the legal wrong suffered and the damages claimed, and, furthermore, 
establish a sufficient basis to determine damages with some decree of 
certainty. See, Hunsaker v. State. 870 P.2d 893, at 897 (Utah 1993); See 
also. Mahmood v. Ross. 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999). 
2. In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that any proposed introduction 
of recorded telephonic statements of Mr. William Pringle, an Arizona resident 
and not a party to this action, does not fall under any hearsay exception 
pursuant to Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
3. The Court's earlier Order denying Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment invited Plaintiffs to pursue and perfect the testimony of 
Mr. William Pringle through deposition or through Mr. William Pringle's 
appearance at trial. Neither avenue was pursued since 1999. 
4. In the instant case, the earlier recording of the conversation 
between William Pringle and Plaintiff, Stephen Schwartz, is, under present 
circumstances, hearsay under Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and, 
insofar as William Pringle is not an adverse party, was not then making a 
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dying declaration and would have been subject to otherwise having his 
deposition taken or being subpoenaed appropriately for trial, there is no 
available exception to the phone transcripts or the recording's admissibility, 
even assuming proper authentication, pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence. 
5. In light of the sworn testimony of Mr. Bryan Pringle and the 
prior Affidavits of Mr. William Pringle, the Plaintiffs have left the issue of 
proximate cause of any injury claimed to be suffered by Plaintiffs, rather in 
tort or in contract, to conjecture. In light of the same, the Plaintiffs' case fails 
on the issue of proximate cause. See, Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 133 
P.2d 680 (Utah 1943), cited in Thurston v. Worker's Compensation Fund, 83 
P.3d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
6. The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs' claim would fail based 
upon the uncertainty of any damage calculation which the Court might 
otherwise seek to undertake. See, Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 
1999). Simply stated, the price at which the Plaintiffs might otherwise have 
prevailed in purchasing the property cannot be established by the verified 
evidence that is before the Court or that could legitimately be presented at 
trial. While the Plaintiffs have put forth that the sale was completed at the 
sum of $ 11,250.00, Mr. William Pringle, by Affidavit, and Mr. Bryan Pringle, 
by deposition, have both stated that the property would have continued to be 
bid up by the Pringle family to a sum in excess of $35,000.00, far beyond the 
Defendants' authority to bid and, thus, in any event, the Plaintiffs would not 
have been the prevailing bidder. 
7. Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
when a Motion for Summary Judgment is made and supported as provided in 
the rule, adverse parties may not rest upon mere allegations or denials and 
pleadings, but responses must set forth specific verified facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no non-hearsay evidence before the 
Court to overcome William Pringle's Affidavits or the deposition of Bryan 
Pringle. 
8. Plaintiffs in the instant case have presented no evidence that 
establishes a direct causal connection between the alleged negligence and/or 
breach of contract by Defendants and those damages claimed by Plaintiffs. 
Simply stated, Plaintiffs have not offered evidence sufficiently probative 
which tends to prove the proposition that for some sum of money up to and 
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including the sum of $35,000.00, Plaintiffs would have been the prevailing 
bidders at the tax sale regarding the lot in question in May of 1999. Similarly, 
the damages, were they to be calculated, would further be subject to the 
Court's conjecture with the Court attempting to establish a price at which the 
Plaintiffs might have otherwise prevailed in their quest to purchase the subj ect 
real property to establish a theoretical base from which ultimate damages 
would otherwise be calculated based on present value. 
9. It cannot be gainsaid that the Court is left to sheer conj ecture to 
determine what price, if any, the Plaintiffs might have prevailed at the time 
of sale had the Defendants bid the property up to the authorized sum of 
$35,000.00, which sum, once again, as the Affidavit of William Pringle and 
the deposition of Bryan Pringle affirm, would have been insufficient to 
prevail at the tax sale and constitute a winning bid. 
10. Utah law mandates that the amount of consequential damages 
to be established by the Court should be calculable "within a reasonable 
certainty". See, Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999). 
11. In light of the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the Court 
hereby ultimately rules that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a legal wrong, but 
have otherwise failed to establish a causal connection between the wrong and 
the alleged damages or enabled the Court in any way to accurately determine 
such damages were causation otherwise established. In light of the same, the 
Court finds that the Plaintiffs are entitled to nominal damages in the sum of 
One Dollar ($1.00). See, Turtle Management Inc. v. Hagaas Management, 
645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). Judgment should be entered accordingly with the 
Plaintiffs and Defendants thereafter bearing their own costs. (R463-460). 
On appeal these conclusions are reviewed for correctness. See Newman v. Sonnenberg, 81 
P.3d 808 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). In Newman, Judge Thome clarified that Plaintiffs are 
required to prove each element of their claim except when the matter at issue falls within 
the purview of "common knowledge". IcL at 813. Bidding at tax sales and the intent, desire, 
and economic strength of a competing bidder is certainly not within the purview of common 
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knowledge. Appellants have not marshaled any evidence contrary to the District Court 
Judge's conclusions. 
ISSUE VI 
Appellants, in Failing To Timely File Any Objections to the District Court's 
Findings, Conclusions, and Summary Judgment, Have Waived Their Objections 
Appellees submitted to the District Court proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
law, and Summary Judgment for execution on August 12,2005. Appellees resubmitted the 
same documents for signature on October 27,2005. (R442-427). Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) 
of the Utah R. Civ.P., Appellants were obligated to file any objections to the proposed 
summary judgment order within five(5) days after initial service. Appellants filed no such 
objection. 
Ultimately, on January 7,2006, the District Court, still having received no objection 
from Appellants, notified Appellants that in the event the District Court received no 
objections by March 1,2006, the Court would enter the summary judgment as submitted by 
Appellees in the instant case. (R447). Appellants still filed no objection. Thereafter, the 
District Court, on March 13, 2006, in accord with its notice dated January 7, 2006, entered 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Summary Judgment that had been submitted 
to it seven months before in August of 2005 by Appellees' counsel. (R447, 470-448,459). 
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It cannot be gainsaid that had Appellants any objections to the District Court's judgment 
or desired to verify William Pringle's mental status, the District Court's allowance of an 
additional seven months to do so was abundant. Appellants did nothing. 
In 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc.. 99 P.3d 801 (Utah 2004), Justice Durrant of 
the Utah Supreme Court considered an appeal from a District Court opinion wherein Judge 
Thorne had granted Appellees' Motion for Non-suit or involuntary dismissal under Rule 
41(b) of the Utah R.Civ. P. In so ruling, Judge Thorne had "entered his findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in which he found that "[t]he [Defendant's] roof deicing cable was not 
the proximate cause of the fire" and that the cable's design was not defective as defined by 
Utah Code §78-15-6. In Easy Heat, plaintiff actually filed a general objection to the 
District Court's findings regarding dismissal and non-suit alleging that the findings were 
"inaccurate and incomplete". Thereafter plaintiff perfected its appeal. At the Supreme 
Court, defendants argued that plaintiff had waived its right to appeal the sufficiency of 
Judge Thome's findings because plaintiff raised the issue as to their sufficiency for the first 
time on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court agreed with defendant's position reciting the 
following salutary principle: 
"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that 
issue"Brookside Mobile Home Park Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, Tfl4, 48 
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P.3d 968 (citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 
1998)). This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error 
and allows for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. Badger, 
966 P.2d at 847. For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the 
error "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be 
specifically raisedf,] and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority." Brookside, 2002 Ut 48 at ^ f 14, 48 P.3d 
968 (quoting Badger, 966 P.2d at 847). Issues that are not raised at trial are 
usually deemed waived. Id. 
Certainly, Judge Thome's summary dismissal at trial in Easy Heat of plaintiff s suit 
is legally distinguishable from a summary judgment. Regardless, Judge Mower went far 
beyond Rule 7, Utah R. Civ. P. to allow Appellants over seven months to file any objection 
to Appellees' proposed findings, conclusions, and summary judgment order. Appellants 
filed no objections to the findings, conclusions or summary judgment as proposed. 
Appellees assert that by this indolent course, Appellants ultimately have waived any 
objection to the same. Id; see also, e.g., Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). 
Indeed, in light of the overwhelming dispositive evidence established by the affidavits of 
William Pringle and the deposition of Bryan Pringle, the District Court's summary judgment 
is clearly sustainable. That Appellants failed to object to the same for a period of seven 
months before the District Court amply demonstrates that any contentions seeking to 
challenge these matters on appeal are, indeed, raised for the first time here without 
preservation pursuant to those procedures clearly outlined not only by Rule 7 of the Utah 
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R. Civ. P., but by existing Utah case law. Once again, Appellees are compelled to set forth 
that the Court of Appeals consider this matter for remand only in reference to those 
attorney's fees which should be awarded Appellees in defending this appeal. Nipper v. 
Douglas. 90 P.3d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants' arguments on appeal attempt to establish causation and damages absent 
any evidentiary support for the same. Given years to depose witnesses and memorialize 
witness testimony, Appellants, one a licensed attorney, did nothing. Instead, Appellants 
before the District Court and on appeal have bottomed their arguments on self serving 
hearsay recitals and alleged statements of a declarant who Appellants' conceded would 
never be a witness at trial. Rule 56(c) and (e), Utah R. Civ. P. indicate that motions for 
summary judgment must be supported or opposed by such facts "as would be admissible in 
evidence . . .". Appellants provided the District Court with no credible testimony to bear 
their burden of causation to counter the multiple affidavits and deposition relied on by 
Appellees as fomenting Judge Mower's summary judgment of 2006. Appellants have for 
six years maintained their cause of action bottomed on hearsay and presumptions contrary 
to both Utah procedural and substantive law. Appellants' brief on appeal and their 
addendum resurrects this plethora of hearsay, asserting as fact alleged declarations that are 
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inadmissible as a matter of law. And, even were the Court of Appeals to emaciate Rule 56 
and consider Appellants' assertions, Appellants, nonetheless, mischaracterize the full 
meaning of the hearsay they rely on. 
Ultimately, the District Court, apprised that Appellants would never call William 
Pringle to contradict or recant his affidavits, had only that evidence contained in the 
affidavits of William Pringle and the deposition of Bryan Pringle to consider. Given seven 
months to review and object to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
summary judgment, Appellants were indolent in filing any objections thereto despite Rule 
7, Utah R. Civ. P. 
Appellees ultimately assert that by such inactivity, Appellants have waived any 
arguments on appeal. Moreover, as Appellants' arguments are once again bottomed on 
hearsay, Appellees believe that the appeal, ill-conceived factually and absent support in the 
substantive law, may entitle Appellees to attorney's fees. 
DATED this S I day of September, 2006. 
HUGHES AND RANDALL 
MICHAEL D. HUGHES 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Insofar as Appellants have provided two mailing addresses, I, Michael D. Hughes, 
certify that on September c ^ / , 2006, I served two copies of the attached Brief of 
Appellees upon Appellants, by first class mail with postage prepaid at the following address: 
Stephen H. Schwartz 
Ann Schwartz 
PO Box 1524 
Sedona,AZ 86339-1524 
I also certify that a notice, by way of correspondence, was sent to Appellants on September 
<*4/, 2006, notifying Appellants that two copies of Appellees Brief had been sent to the 
Sedona, Arizona address. This notice was mailed to the following address: 
Stephen H. Schwartz 
Ann Schwartz 
PO Box 446 
Hatch, UT 84735 
I further certify that Appellees brief was emailed to Appellants at the following email 
address: 
StephenSchwartz@earthlink.net 
MICHAEL D. 
HUGHES AND RANDALL, PC 
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MICHAEL D. HUGHES (Bar No. 1572) 
HUGHES & BURSELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah. 84770 
Telephone: (435) 673-4892 
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IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN H. SCHWARTZ and 
ANN SCHWARTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
BRAD ADAIR, SOUTHERN UTAH TITLE 
COMPANY, and RAY SPENCER 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020600042 
Judge David L. Mower 
The Defendants5 Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment came on for heating 
telephonically on June 3, 2005 with Stephen H. Schwartz, Esq., appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs and 
Michael D. Hughes, Esq., appearing on behalf of Defendants. Having reviewed the Affidavits in the 
case, and making due inquiry as to the availability of William Pringle as a witness for trial, and being 
further apprised of that sworn testimony of BryanPringle taken by deposition on or about December 
9, 2004, m Las Vegas, Nevada, the Court hereby enters byway of summary judgment the following 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. 
a i 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs retained Defendants, Southern Utah Title Company and Brad Adair, as 
Plaintiffs' agents and instructed said Defendants to attend the May 1999 tax sale in Kanab County 
and to and bid up to $35,000.00 to purchase certain real property in Kane County, more particularly 
described as Lot 25, Plat B, Zions View Mountain Estates (hereinafter "the real property"). 
2. Plaintiffs caused to be forwarded to Defendants the sum of $35,000.00 on or about 
May 14, 1999 to be used by Defendants to bid on the real property at the tax sale. 
3. Subsequent thereto, the tax sale occurred on May 20, 1999 with Ray Spencer 
appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs pursuant to the agency created by Plaintiffs5 letter and those 
funds earlier transferred. At the tax sale, the real property was struck off for sale for $ 11,250.00 with 
Mr. William Pringle submitting the prevailing bid. Mr. Spencer failed to follow Plaintiffs' written 
instructions, and ceased bidding as all of Mr. Spencer's prior bids had only resulted in a yet greater 
bid by Mr. Pringle. The nature and significance of Mr. Pringle's testimony by Af&davit and that of 
his son, Bryan Pringle, by deposition shall be discussed later. 
4. Plaintiffs initially filed their case in Federal Court seeking damages as against 
Defendants based on theories of breach of contract, negligence, and further seeking punitive 
damages. The basis for diversity jurisdiction in the Federal Court was largely bottomed on 
Plaintiffs' cause of action for punitive damages. 
5. On January 31,2002 the Honorable Dale A. Kimball, the United States District Court 
2 
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Judge, entered an order dismissing the Federal case by reason of Plaintiffs' failure to come forward 
with any evidence that would sustain a punitive damage award. (See Exhibit "A" attached hereto, 
at Page 3). 
6. It is presently undisputed by either Plaintiffs or Defendants that Judge Kimball's 
Order, in reference to Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages is res judicata and, insofar as the same 
was not appealed at the Federal Court level, this claim is now barred. See, McCarthy v. State, 265 
P.2d 387 (Utah 1953); Wright, Miller and Cooper, Chapter 13 at Section 4436. See also, in light of 
the Court's ultimate ruling regarding nominal damages, Utah Code Annotated 78-18-1, which, were 
the punitive damage claim presently allowable, would preclude substantive compensation. 
7. Both parties initially moved for Summary Judgment. Defendants based their Motion 
for Summary Judgment, in large part, on the Affidavits of William C. Pringle with Mr. Pringle' s last 
Affidavit filed in May of 2003. 
8. Mr. Pringle's Affidavit of May 2003 stated that he was specifically familiar with the 
real property and had, at one time, served as sales manager for the developers of the larger parcel 
from which the subject property was but a single lot. Indeed, Mr. Pringle, by Affidavit, indicated 
that at one point in time he had acquired a minority interest as a developer in the subdivision. 
9. Mr. Pringle further verified that he subscribed to the Southern Utah News, a 
newspaper generally published in Kane County and through that medium became aware of the tax 
sale regarding the subject real property while Mr. Pringle wras residing in Arizona, 
3 
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10. Mr. Pringle's Affidavit further states that he was aware, by examination of his own 
plats, that the subj ect real property in question was a rim or view lot and that these rim lots had been 
made larger by the original subdividers and were one acre, approximately twice the size of the 
interior lots. 
11. Mr. Pringle' s Affidavit further stated that, at the time of the tax sale on May 20,1999, 
he was personally aware that lots of one-half acre in the subdivision had a then present value of 
around $50,000.00 and that in his mind it was clear that the subject property was worth well more 
than $50,000.00. 
12. Mr. Pringle, by Affidavit, further stated that at the time the tax sale was conducted 
in Kane County, he was involved in a bidding process with other bidders and that, regardless of 
whatever other bid was submitted, Mr. Pringle would jump that bid which in his terminology 
indicated that he would increase it substantially and almost immediately. 
13. Mr. Pringle verified that he was bidding against the Defendant in the instant case, Ray 
Spencer, who the Court has heretofore found was bidding as an agent of Plaintiffs. Mr. Pringle's 
Affidavit clearly states that had the bidding gone up to $35,000.00 he had no doubt that he would 
have bid higher on the property in light of his personal knowledge as to its value. 
14. Mr. Pringle further provided information, by Affidavit, that he had money well in 
excess of $35,000.00 to complete the purchase of the subject property. 
15. Mr. Pringle, by Affidavit, further indicated that Plaintiff, Stephen Schwartz, contacted 
4 
him offering approximately $30,000.00 for the property and that Plaintiff Schwartz was advised that 
Mr. Pringle's son and daughter-in-law were co-investors with him which curtailed a quick response. 
Subsequent to that time, in the recorded telephone conversation referenced above, Mr. Pringle 
advised Mr. Schwartz that the family was not interested in selling the property to Mr. Schwartz at 
that time. 
16. In opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which was bottomed 
on the issue of proximate cause and speculation as to damages, Plaintiffs introduced a typed 
document represented as an accurate memorialization of the phone conversation taped between Mr. 
William Pringle and Plaintiff, Stephen Schwartz. Significantly, the following statement was 
allegedly made by Mr. William Pringle in that 1999 conversation with Mr. Schwartz: 
I am trying to tell you, you know I might have said well, I was going to quit at 20. 
But I don't think I would have. I had the money. And I had the credit line that I 
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17. In a deposition taken in December 2004, Bryan Pringle recognized one of the voices 
in the tape recording provided by Mr. Schwartz as being that of his father, William Pringle. 
18. The Court, consequently, felt that portions of the memorialized phone call introduced 
by Plaintiffs potentially contradicted the Affidavit of William Pringle, which should enable Plaintiffs 
to otherwise elicit Mr. Pringle's testimony at trial to clarify the nature of Mr. Pringle's testimony. 
The Court's thinking is reflected in it's Decision and Order for Motion for Summary Judgment over 
the signature of the Honorable David L. Mower, executed on July 22,2004 and docketed in July 27, 
5 
2004. (A copy of the Court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit ctB"). 
19. Once again, in the earlier Order of July 2004, this Court specifically continued the 
matter so that Plaintiffs could elicit Mr. William Pringle's testimony at trial. Consequently, in July 
2004, this Court denied both Motions for Summary Judgment believing that the transcript of the 
recorded phone call created some confusion as to what the ultimate testimony of William Pringle 
would be. Based upon the potential discrepancy only, this Court left the matter open for trial, 
believing that, at that time, the Plaintiffs should be allowed to elicit Mr. Pringle5 s testimony at trial 
and subject the veracity of his Affidavit to cross examination. 
20. Ultimately, the tape recording of Mr. Pringle and/or any transcript of that tape 
recording is hearsay pursuant to the Utah Rules of Evidence and does not fall under any listed 
exception pursuant to Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. It cannot be gainsaid that Defendants 
object to the admissibility of the same at trial, and, thus, ultimately these matters cannot otherwise 
be judicially considered. 
21. After the July 2004 Order was entered, Defendants took the deposition of Mr. Bryan 
Pringle in December of 2004. Mr. Bryan Pringle testified in his deposition that after Mr. William 
Pringle filed his last Affidavit in the Spring of 2003, Mr. William Pringle suffered a cortical stroke 
on July 10, 2003, which stroke was unknown to the parties and this Court in July of 2004. There is 
no verified testimony, whatsoever, in opposition to this statement. 
22. Mr. Bryan Pringle farther testified that his father presently has no recollection, 
6 
whatsoever, of 1999, and cannot remember within one hour of eating lunch whether he has in fact 
eaten lunch or what he ate. 
23. Mr. Bryan Pringle further stated that his father's mental and physical health is so 
compromised by his cortical stroke in July 2003, that Mr. William Pringle now remains primarily 
confined to his home in Sun City, Arizona. 
24. At the telephonic hearing on June 3, 2005, three days before the scheduled trial, the 
Court further confirmed that the Plaintiffs did not have Mr. William Pringle available for trial nor 
did they intend to call him for trial. No deposition of WilHam Pringle was ever taken or 
memorialized since 1999 in reference to this case. 
25. Mr. Bryan Pringle further testified that he also was familiar with the property in 
question and that two to three weeks prior to the tax sale in 1999, Mr. Bryan Pringle and his father, 
Mr. William Pringle, agreed to joint venture the purchase of the real property, believing they could 
obtain $50,000.00 or more upon resale of the lot. 
26. Mr. Bryan Pringle further testified that, even had Defendants bid up to Plaintiffs' 
$35,000.00 bid limit, as authorized by Plaintiffs, that William Pringle, as agent for the joint venture, 
would have bid a higher amount for the property. 
27. Mr. Bryan Pringle further testified that he and his father had received an offer to sell 
the property for what he recalled was $32,000.00 shortly after the tax purchase and that they were 
not interested in selling the property even for the sum of $40,000.00 immediately after the sale. 
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28. Mr. Bryan Pringle further testified that his father had approximately $100,000 00 
available on the date of the tax sale to use toward the purchase of the property, if necessary, and that 
in no event would a bid $35,000.00 on behalf of Plaintiffs prevailed at the tax sale in reference to 
the particular real property in question. 
29. In opposition to Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs 
offered no affidavit pursuant to Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contrary to the sworn 
testimony of Bryan Pringle and, rather, chose to simply contest the weight to be accorded Mr. Bryan 
Pringle's deposition. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Whether Plaintiffs frame their cause of action in contract or in tort, Utah law requires 
that Plaintiffs must establish a significant causal nexus between the legal wrong suffered and the 
damages claimed, and, furthermore, establish a sufficient basis to determine damages with some 
decree of certainty. See, Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, at 897 (Utah 1993); See also, Mahmood 
v, Ross, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999). 
2. In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that any proposed introduction of recorded 
telephonic statements of Mr. William Pringle, an Arizona resident and not a party to this action, does 
not fall under any hearsay exception pursuant to Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
3. The Court's earlier Order denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
invited Plaintiffs to pursue and perfect the testimony of Mr. William Pringle through deposition or 
8 
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through Mr. William Pringle's appearance at trial. Neither avenue was pursued since 1999. 
4. In the instant case, the earlier recording of the conversation between "William Pringle 
and Plaintiff, Stephen Schwartz, is, under present cncumstances, hearsay under Rule 801 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and, insofar as William Pringle is not an adverse party, was not then making a 
dying declaration and would have been subject to otherwise having his deposition taken or being 
subpoenaed appropriately for trial, there is no available exception to the phone transcripts or the 
recording's admissibility, even assuming proper authentication, pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence. 
5. In light of the sworn testimony of Mr. Bryan Pringle and the prior Affidavits of Mr. 
William Pringle, the Plaintiffs have left the issue of proximate cause of any injury claimed to be 
suffered by Plaintiffs, rather in tort or in contract, to conjecture. In light of the same, the Plaintiffs' 
case fails on the issue of proximate cause. See, Sumisonv. Streeter-Smithlnc 133 P.2d 680 (Utah 
1943), cited in Thurston v. Worker's Compensation Fund, 83 P.3d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 
6. The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs' claim would fail based upon the uncertainty 
of any damage calculation which the Court might otherwise seek to undertake. See, Mahmood v. 
Ross, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999). Simply stated, the price at which the Plaintiffs might otherwise 
have prevailed in purchasing the property cannot be established by the verified evidence that is 
before the Court or that could legitimately be presented at trial. While the Plaintiffs have put forth' 
that the sale was completed at the sum of $11,250.00, Mr. William Pringle, by Affidaivt, and Mr. 
Bryan Pringle, by deposition, have both stated that the property would have continued to be bid up 
9 
by the Pringle family to a sum in excess of $35,000.00, far beyond the Defendants5 authority to bid 
and, thus, in any event, the Plaintiffs would not have been the prevailing bidder. 
7. Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, when a Motion for 
Summary Judgment is made and supported as provided in the rule, adverse parties may not rest upon 
mere allegations or denials and pleadings, but responses must set forth specific verified facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no non-hearsay evidence before the Court 
to overcome William Pringle's Affidavits or the deposition of Bryan Pringle. 
8. Plaintiffs in the instant case have presented no evidence that establishes a direct 
causal connection between the alleged negligence and/or breach of contract by Defendants and those 
damages claimed by Plaintiffs. Simply stated, Plaintiffs have not offered evidence sufficiently 
probative which tends to prove the proposition that for some sum of money up to and including the 
sum of $35,000.00, Plaintiffs would have been the prevailing bidders at the tax sale regarding the 
lot in question in May of 1999. Similarly, the damages, were they to be calculated, would further 
be subject to the Court's conjecture with the Court attempting to establish a price at which the 
Plaintiffs might have otherwise prevailed in their quest to purchase the subject real property to 
establish a theoretical base from which ultimate damages would otherwise be calculated based on 
present value. 
9. It cannot be gainsaid that the Court is left to sheer conj ecture to determine what price, 
if any, the Plaintiffs might have prevailed at the time of sale had the Defendants bid the property up 
10 
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to the authorized sum of $35,000.00, which sum, once again, as the Affidavit of William Pringle and 
the deposition of Bryan Pringle affirm, would have been insufficient to prevail at the tax sale and 
constitute a winning bid. 
10. Utah law mandates that the amount of consequential damages to be established by 
the Court should be calculable "within a reasonable certainty". See, Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 
933 (Utah 1999). 
1L In light of the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the Court hereby ultimately rules 
that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a legal wrong, but have otherwise failed to establish a causal 
connection between the wrong and the alleged damages or enabled the Court in any way to 
accurately determine such damages were causation otherwise established. In light of the same, the 
Court finds that the Plaintiffs are entitled to nominal damages in the sum of One Dollar ($1.00). See, 
Turtle Management Inc. v. Hagaas Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). Judgment should be 
entered accordingly with the Plaintiffs and Defendants thereafter bearing their own costs. 
JUDGMENT 
The Court having reviewed the Affidavits of William Pringle, the sworn testimony of Bryan 
Pringle, and having entertained Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, and in light 
of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law stated therein, hereby enters judgment for the 
Plaintiffs as against the Defendants on both contract and tort claims as against Defendants for 
nominal damages in the sum of One Dollar ($1 00). Each party to bear their own costs. 
11 
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Plaintiffs' Complaint for punitive damages on the basis of analysis set forth in the Court's 
fifth and sixth findings, supra, is hereby dismissed as a matter of res judicata 
DATED this / • day of August, 2005 
BY THE COURT 
/' 
MOWER 
nit Judge 
2 
12 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true, and correct copy of the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT was placed in the United States mail, at 
St. George, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the \ 2— day of August, 2005, 
addressed as follows: 
Stephen H. Schwartz 
Ann Schwartz 
PO Box 446 
Hatch, UT 84735 
Email: StephenSchwaiJ2@earthlink.net 
Stephen BL Schwartz 
Ann Schwartz 
45 Cypress Drive 
Sedona, AZ 86336-6633 
J l W a ^ 3 ~ )X o$h>\ 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICROE I ^ M P ^ 
B Y :
— - — _ 
CENTRAL DIVISION DEPUTY CLERK 
STEPHEN H, and ANN SCHWARTZ, 
individuals, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BRAID ADAIR, an individual, RAY 
SPENCER, an individual, and 
SOUTHERN UTAH TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 2:01 CV6K 
This matter is before the court on an Objection to Magistrates Report and 
Recommendation, which was filed by Defendants Brad Adair, Ray Spencer, and Southern Utah 
Title Company (^Defendants'*). A hearing on tlie Objection was held on January 15, 2002 At 
the hearing, Defendants were represented by Michael R. Johnson, and Plaintiffs Stephen and Ann 
Schwartz were represented by Mr. Schwartz, pro se.1 Before the hearing, the court considered 
carefully the memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties, along with the Magistrate 
Judge's Report and Recommendation (the CCR&R") and Defendants5 Objections thereto, Since 
taking the matter under advisement, die court has further consideicd the law and facts relating to 
the motion Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Order. 
1
 Mr. Schwartz is an attorney, buL he is not licensed to practice in Utah. 
On December 10, 2001, the Magistrate Tudge issued an R&R in this case, recommending 
that Defendants' Motion 10 Dismiss, or m the Alternatn e. for Summary Judgment be denied2 
Pursuant to Rule 72(b), this court must "make a de no\o determination upon the record, or after 
additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judged disposition to which specific written 
objection has been made." Fed. R. Civ P. 72(b). Among other things, Defendants have objected 
to the Magistrate Judge's determination that this court has subject matter jurisdiction. 
This case is before the court based on diversity jurisdiction Defendants contend, 
however, that the amount in controversy does not meet the jurisdictional minimum of $75,000. 
They claim that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that 'cit is not a legal 
certainty that his claim is less than the jurisdictional amount."' Adams v Reliance Standard Life 
Ins Co., 225 F 3 d 1179, 1183 (10th Cii. 2000). 
This court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden . There is 
no evidence that the Reai Property at issue was worth more than $75,000 at the time of the sale 3 
Because it is undisputed that Plaintiffs would have had to pay at least $11,250 to obtain the Real 
2
 The relevant facts and issues are thoroughly set forth in the R&R and will not be 
repeated here 
3
 The only e\idence brought forward was an affidavit of Mr. Schwartz, expressing his 
opinion about the value of the property- The Magistrate Judge, however, ruled that this 
testimony is inadmissible. Further. Plaintiffs have failed to designate an expert witness to testify 
about the value, and the deadline for expert designations expired on July 2, 2001. Thus, the only 
evidence that could be introduced at trial is that the property recently sold for $75,000 and Mr. 
Priugle's testimony that he believes that aL (he Lime of the Lax sale the property was v\orth 
between S50.000 and $60,000. 
2 
Pioperrv. their actual damages weald be 563*750. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the amount-in-
controversy requirement, unless they are entitled to punitive damages. 
While it is true that actual and punitive damages may be aggregated to satisfy the amount-
in-controversy requirement Plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages in this case. Plaintiffs 
and Defendants have argued extensively about whether punitive damages are available in the 
instant case. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' negligence claims are actually contract claims 
because the wrongful conduct at issue was the breach of an express term of the contract between 
the parties, and that punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract claims. In 
contrast Plaintiffs argue that punitive damages are available when one breaches a duty of care 
toward another, even where the relationship between the parties originates in contract. See DCR> 
Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co , 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983). Plaintiffs argue that in this case, an 
independent duty arose from the contract-i.e., a fiduciary duty, the breach of which could entitle 
Plaintiffs to punitive damages. 
This court need not decide whether Defendants had a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs. Even if 
a fiduciary duty existed. Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with any evidence that would 
sustain a punitive damages award. The discover}/ deadline in this case was on September 17, 
2001. Tn response to Defendants' argument in their summary judgment motion that Plaintiffs 
have offered no evidence of conduct that would support an award of punitive damages. Plaintiffs 
have come forward with no evidence to the contrary. Although disco very was not over at the 
time Plaintiffs filed their opposition memorandum, they have had several months since that time 
to come forward with evidence supporting their claim that Defendants demonstrated a knowing 
:> 
J\1 
and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of Plaintiffs7 rights. Plaintiffs even had an 
express invitation to respond to Defendants' objections to the R&R, but rhey have failed to offer 
any such evidence. Plaintiffs merely argue that the failure to bid on the Real Property is 
sufficiently egregious to allow the trier of fact to consider awarding punitive damages. Given 
that discovery is over in this case, Plaintiffs cannot rest on mere allegations in their Amended 
Complaint to demonstrate entitlement to punitive damages. 
Thus, because Plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages in this casc^ it is a legal 
certainty that they cannot satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. Consequently, this 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants5 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
subject Matter Jurisdiction is GRANTED, and this action is dismissed without prejudice. The 
final pretrial conference, scheduled for March 13, 2002, and the trial, scheduled for April 3, 
2002.> &re hereby V A C A t b U . 
DATED this 31 st day of January, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
DALE A. KIMBALL 7 
United States District Judge 
18 
4 
rsi 
United Spates Disrrici Court: 
for "che 
District of Utah 
February 1, 2 0 02 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
Re: 2:01-cv-OOOOS 
True and correct copies of the attached were either mailed or faxed by the 
clerk to the following: 
Stephen EL Schwartz 
45 CYPRESS DR 
SEDOINTA, AZ 8 6 3 3 6 - 6 6 3 3 
Ann S c h w a r t z 
4 5 CYPRESS DR 
SEDONA, AZ 86335-6633 
Mzr. Michael D. Hugrhes, Esq. 
HUGHES & ASSOCIATES 
187 N 100 W 
ST GEORGE, UT 8477 0 
Mr. Alan L Sullivan, Esq. 
SNELL 5c WILMER LLP 
15 W SOUTH TEMPLE STE 12 0 0 
GATEWAY TOWER W 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
JFAX 9.2571800 
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FILED 
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'XTh DISTORT COURT 
DISTRICT COURT, KANE, UTAH 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Ut 84741 
Telephone 435-644-2^58 Fax 435-6^4-2052 
STEPHEN H SCHWARTZ and ANN ' 
SCHWARTZ, 
Plaintiffs, 
YS. 
BRAD ADAIR, SOUTHERN UTAH TITLE 
COMPANY, and RAY SPENCER 
Defendants. 
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No 020600042 
Judge David L Mower 
Cross-motions for summary judgment are pending. Oral argument has been held. A 
transcript tnereor nas Deen prepared., i ttave reviewed it. 
There is a factual dispute. Hence, summary judgment is not appropriate. I will explain. 
This case is about a contract, whether it was breached and if there are damages. 
Plaintiffs claim that they hired defendants to act as agents and to bid for them as if they had 
been present at a county tax sale. 
Plaintiffs were not the successful bidders for a particular piece of land. William Pringle 
was. Plaintiffs5 claim is that defendants did not follow instructions which allowed Mr. Pringle to 
buy the property, all to their damage. 
Mr. Pringle's testimony has been used in the summary judgment proceedings, once in an 
affidavit and once in a transcript of a recorded telephone call Were there to be a trial in this 
case, his testimony would be important in detenrnning the cause of the breach and the damages 
Page 2-DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Schwarts vAdair - 020600042 
In his affidavit dated May 18, 2003, he states: 
"Had the bidding gone up to ...$35,000.00... I would have still bid higher.. . 
I had monies well in excess of... $35,000.00...." 
In the telephone conversation of June 21, 1999, he states: 
"...J might have said ... I was going to quit at 20. ..."(From line 28, page 13, Exhibit 3B 
of Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum.) 
These two statements are contradictory. Plaintiff should have the opportunity to try to 
elicit them from Mr. Pringle at trial. The statements would not be hearsay because of Rule 
801(d)(1)(A), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The motions for summary judgment are denied. 
DATED this ~ 
On 1 
MOTIONS FOR S' 
^7 
Certificate of Notification 
_, 2004, a copy of Hie above DECISION AND ORDER ON 
Y JUDGMENT was sent to: 
Name 
Stephen H Schwartz 
Stephen H Schwartz 
Michael D Hughes 
Address j 
PO Box 446 
Hatch Ut 84735 | 
45 Cypress Drive 
j SedonaAz 86336 | 
187 North 100 West ] 
St George Ut 84770 ' 
X 
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MICHAEL D. HUGHES (Bar No 1572) 
HUGHES & BURSELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
187 North. 100 West 
St George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 673-4892 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CIVIL DIVISION 
STEPHEN H. SCHWARTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AFFIDAVIT FOR WILLIAM C. 
PRINGLE 
BRAD ADAIR, SOUTHERN UTAH TITLE 
COMPANY, and RAY SPENCER 
Defendants, Civil No. 2:01CV0006K 
STATE OF ARIZONA 
COUNTY OF 
:ss 
) 
William C. Pringle being duly sworn deposes and says: 
L I am an adult and am personally familiar with the facts set forth in this Affidavit 
unless the same are set forth as being based upon information and belief. 
2. I presently reside in Sun City, Arizona 
3. I subscribed to and receive The Southern Utah News, a newspaper generally 
published in Kane County, and became apprised, through said newspaper, of a tax sale to be 
conducted on the following described lot: Lot 25, Plat B, Zion View Mountain Estates. 
4. I was personally familiar with this particular lot as I had a plat of this subdivision in 
my home. Indeed, I had, at one time, owned Lot 21, Plat B, Zion View Mountain Estates. 
5. In the past, I had also served as the sales manager for one of the original developers, 
Tri-State Development, and at a subsequent time acquired a minority interest in the same within that 
subdivision with Darryl Christensen and Stan Sure. 
6. At the time of the tax sale on May 20, 1999,1 had traveled to Kane County to be 
present at this sale with the intent to purchase, among other parcels, Lot 25, Plat B5 Zion View 
Mountain Estates. 
7. I was aware, by examination of my own plats, that this lot was in excess of an acre. 
I was also aware, by reason of my former ownership of Lot 21, and my former relationship with this 
i_ j ; _ ^ „ : „ _ i_«a.i_ _ _ _ i _ _ __.-___ , __ .,,.^,4 ^ „ _ ^ - ; ^ T ^-r*~~~ - . i ^ - . - . ^ i_;„ ^ „ _ „ : _ : _ _ i __. 3 _.-_„_. _.i 
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w e^re approximately twenty-five (25) rim lots. Indeed, the original subdividers had made these rim 
lots larger, by reason of the fact that in many cases they had slopes to them which otherwise might 
have compromised their marketability. 
8. At the time of the tax sale on May 20, 1999,1 was also aware that lots of one-half 
(1/2) acre in this subdivision had a then present value of around Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($50,000.00). 
2 
9. In my mmd, then, it was clear that this lot was worth well more than Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($50,000 00) At the time the tax sale was conducted, by Kane County, I wras involved m 
a bidding process with other bidders. Regardless of whatever other bid was submitted, I would 
"jump that bid", that is to say, I would increase it substantially and almost immediately after another 
bid was obtained there was no delay, on my pan, in the bidding process I was bidding against a 
gentlemen that I knew as Ray Spencer. 
10. It was my intent at that tax sale, and I conveyed this intent through the bidding 
process, to obtain Lot 25, Plat B, Zion View Mountain Estates. 
11. Had the bidding gone up to Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00), I have no 
doubt in my mind that I would have still bid higher on this property in light of my knowledge as to 
it's value. 
12. I felt that this property, even at a price in excess of Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars 
(535,000.00) would have been an excellent investment At the time of the bid, once again, I would 
have bid more than Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) for the property and, had a bid of 
Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) been made, I would have immediately increased the bid 
at the tax sale. 
13. I had no potential buyer in mind at the time of the tax sale but felt that I could quickly 
turn the property for around Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) or, perhaps, sell it on terms for 
Sixty Thousand Dollars ($60,000 00) or more. I have, in fact, recently sold it to a doctor for 
3 
Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00). 
14. Some time after the sale, in May 1999,1 wTas contacted by a gentleman who identified 
himself as Stephen Schwartz. Mr. SchwTartz told me that he was interested in purchasing the 
property and indicated he would offer me Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) for the same. 
15. At that time, I knew I would not have sold the property for less than the price I had 
in mind but, regardless of this fact, I never received any documents, whatsoever, from Mr. Schwartz, 
offering to purchase the property for Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) or, for that matter, for 
any amount of money. 
16. I had traveled to Kane County, from my home in Sun City, Arizona, which is near 
Phoenix, to attend this auction specifically with the intent of buying this lot among other real 
property assets. When I bid at an auction, I do not initiate bids on any lots unless I am prepared to 
go forward and buy the same. Once again, I bid quickly and with intent and in reference to this rim' 
lot, regarding which it's size, topography, and location were well known to me, I was more than 
prepared, once again, to bid in excess of Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) at the tax sale. 
FURTHER AFFIANT S AYETH NOT 
DATED this ^ day of January, 2001. 
WILLIAM C. T R I P L E -
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3 ^ day of Jaaaaiy, 2001. 
J 1/ y 
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FILED 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE: DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION Ll ^ - U M M H _ 
STEPHEN H. SCI IWARTZ, 
Plaintiff (s), 
v . 
BRAD ADAIR, et aL, 
Defendant(s). 
The plaint i f f , Stephen H> Schwartz , has made a mot ion to strike the aff idavit 
of Wil l iam C. Pringie, f i led as Exhibit " A " to defendants' mot ion to dismiss, for lack 
of subject matter jur isdict ion. The plaint i f f 's content ion is that the aff idavit of 
Pringle states tha t he wou ld have had at auction the property involved in the case. 
Plaintiff contends the aff idavit has no evidentiary value and is conjectural, 
speculative* and not capable of proof. 
Pringle's aff idavit is four pages in length, and states facts for his awareness 
of the tax sale of the Front View Mountain States property. It shows his interest in 
the sale and famil iari ty w i th the property and their proximate properties. These 
i tems corroborate his claim of intent and what he would have done. The aff idavit 
provides the basis for determining the merits of his evidence as to a fact at issue 
for the motion to dismiss. The aff idavit shows a proper basis for consideration 
under Rule 6 0 2 , F.R.E. and is not subject to exclusion. 
Case No. 01 -CV-006 K 
ORDER 
The plaintiff's motion to strike is therefore without merit and is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
J 
DATED this /ji day of July, 2001 
BY THE COURT: 
Ranald N Boycd '" 
United States Magistrate Judge 
A29 
rsi 
United States District Court 
for rhe 
District of Utah 
July 30, 2C01 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
Re: 2:Ol-cv-00006 
True and correct copies of rhe attached were either mailed or faxed by the 
clerk to the following: 
Stephen H. Schwartz 
45 CYPRESS DR 
SEDONA, AZ 86336-6633 
Ann Schwartz 
45 CYPRESS DR 
SEDOHA, AZ 8S33S-S633 
Mr. Michael D* Hughes, Esq. 
HUGHES 5c ASSOCIATES 
187 N 100 W 
ST GEORGE, UT 8477 0 
Mr. Alan L Sullivan, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER LLP 
15 W SOUTH TEMPLE STE 12 0 0 
GATEWAY TOWER W 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
JFAX 9,2571800 
A30 
MICHAEL D. HUGHES (Bar No. 1572) 
HUGHES & BURSELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 673-4892 
AlanL. Sullivan (3152) 
Michael R. Johnson (7070) 
SNELL & WILMER LX.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
STEPHEN H. SCHWARTZ, SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF WILLIAM C. PRINGLE 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRAD ADAIR, SOUTHERN UTAH 
TITLE COMPANY, and RAY SPENCER 
Defendants. Civil No. 2:01 CV0006K 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF KANE ) 
William C Pringle being duly sworn deposes and sa}rs: 
1. I am an adult and am personally familiar with the facts set forth in this Affidavit. 
2. I am presently living in Kane County, Utah 
3. On May 11, 1999,1 attended a tax sale m Kane County On that day m question, 
I attended that sale with the specific intent and plan to purchase Lot 25, Plat B, Zion View 
Mountain Estates. 
4. Having served as a sales manager for one of the original developers, Tri-State 
Development and having at a subsequent time acquired a minority interest in the subdivision, I was 
personally familiar with Lot 25, Plat B, Zion View Mountain Estates and I came prepared to the 
sale to purchase the property for either my benefit or for subsequent resale. 
5. Tax sales in Kane County must be completed by the tender of money to the 
Treasurer of the County by 5:00 p.m. on the date of the bid. On this date in question, I had 
available to me, monies well in excess of Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) to bid on Lot 
25, Plat B and without any speculation on my part whatsoever, I was prepared to bid in excess of 
Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000 00) to obtain this property which I felt could be quickly 
resold for approximately Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) or, perhaps, on terms for Sixty 
Thousand Dollars ($60,000.00) or more. 
6. After the sale, I was contacted by a gentleman identifying himself as Stephen 
Schwartz. Mr. Schwartz indicated that he was interested in purchasing the property. I advised Mr. 
Schwartz that my son and daughter-in-law were co-investors which curtailed me from providing 
him a quick response , but that he should submit me a written offer for the property. No offer ever 
came. 
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7. I was fully prepared to bid more than Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars (S35,000 00) 
at the time of the auction sale and had those funds available on the date of the auction. I have no 
reason to fabricate my clear intention in that matter which was to purchase the property for my own 
benefit and my plan to do so had been well formulated prior to the auction. 
8. I have made myself available for depositions for the Plaintiff in the instant case and 
continue to be available in Kane County. If put under oath, my testimony would be no different 
than that set forth in this affidavit. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT 
DAi JCD this (llf4 day of July, 200 L 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / 7 ^ day of July, 2001. 
—PGM, Q:^ak_ 
NOTARY PUBLIC : PU: 
Notary Public £ 
Garry M Goodsell S 
K\ 210 N 300 W *£ 
;3) C e d a r City, U7 B4720 «£ 
/ £ / My Commission Expires «$ 
** 03-28-20D2 «* 
- S ta te of Utah «> 
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ORIGINAL 
MICHAEL D. HUGHES (Bar No. 1572) 
WILLIAM O. KIMBALL (Bar No. 9460) 
HUGHES & BURSELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 673-4892 
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MAY 14,2/KI3 
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN H. SCHWARTZ and 
ANN SCHWARTZ 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
BRAD AD AIR, SOUTHERN UTAH TITLE 
COMPANY, and RAY SPENCER 
Defendants, 
AFFIDAVIT FOR WILLIAM C. 
PRINGLE 
Judge Mower 
STATE OF ARIZONA 
COUNTY OF 
William C. Pringle being duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am an adult and am personally familiar with the facts set forth in this Affidavit 
unless the same are set forth as being based upon information and belief. 
2. I presently reside in Sun City, Arizona. 
3. I subscribed to and receive The Southern Utah News, a newspaper generally 
published in Kane County, and became apprised, through said newspaper, of a tax sale to be 
conducted on the following described lot: Lot 25, Plat B, Zion View Mountain Estates. 
4. I was personally familiar with this particular lot as I had a plat of this subdivision 
in my home. Indeed, I had, at one time, owned Lot 21, Plat B, Zion View Mountain Estates. 
5. In the past, I had also served as the sales manager for one of the original develop-
ers, Tri-State Development, and at a subsequent time acquired a minority interest in the same 
within that subdivision with Darryl Christensen and Stan Sure. 
6. At the time of the tax sale on May 20, 1999,1 had traveled to Kane County to be 
present at this sale with the intent to purchase, among other parcels, Lot 25, Plat B, Zion View 
Mountain Estates. 
7. I was aware, by examination of my own plats, that this lot was in excess of an 
acre. I was also aware, by reason of my former ownership of Lot 21, and my former relationship 
with this subdivision, as both a sales manager and partial owner, that this was a rim or view lot 
and that there were approximately twenty-five (25) rim lots. Indeed, the original subdividers had 
made these rim lots larger, by reason of the fact that in many cases they had slopes to them which 
otherwise might have compromised their marketability. 
8. At the time of the tax sale on May 20, 1999,1 was also aware that lots of one-half 
(1/2) acre in this subdivision had a then present value of around Fifty Thousand Dollars 
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($50,000.00). 
9. In my mind, then, it was clear that this lot was worth well more than Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00). At the time the tax sale was conducted, by Kane County, I was 
involved in a bidding process with other bidders. Regardless of whatever other bid was 
submitted, I would "jump that bid", that is to say, I would increase it substantially and almost 
immediately after another bid was obtained there was no delay, on my part, in the bidding 
process. I was bidding against a gentlemen that I knew as Ray Spencer. 
10. It was my intent at that tax sale, and I conveyed this intent through the bidding 
process, to obtain Lot 25, Plat B, Zion View Mountain Estates. 
11. Had the bidding gone up to Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00), I have no 
doubt in my mind that I would have still bid higher on this property in light of my knowledge as 
to it's value. 
12. I felt that this property, even at a price in excess of Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars 
($3 5,000.00) would have been an excellent investment. At the time of the bid, once again, I 
would have bid more than Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) for the property and, had a 
bid of Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) been made, I would have immediately 
increased the bid at the tax sale. 
13. Tax sales in Kane County must be completed by the tender of money to the 
Treasurer of the County by 5:00 p.m. on the date of the bid. On this day in question, I had 
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available to me, monies well in excess of Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000) to bid on Lot 
25, Plat B. 
14. I purchased Lot 25, Plat B for $11,250 on May 20, 1999. 
15. I had no potential buyer in mind at the time of the tax sale but felt that I could 
quickly sell the property for around Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) or, perhaps, sell it on 
terms for Sixty Thousand Dollars ($60,000.00) or more. I have, in fact, sold it to a doctor for 
Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00). 
16. Some time after the sale, in May 1999,1 was contacted by a gentleman who 
identified himself as Stephen Schwartz. Mr. Schwartz told me that he was interested in 
purchasing the property and indicated he would offer me Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) 
for the same. I advised Mr. Schwartz that my son and daughter-in-law were co-investors which 
curtailed me from providing him a quick response, but that he should submit me a written offer 
for the Real Property. 
17. At that time, I knew I would not have sold the property for less than the price I 
had in mind but, regardless of this fact, I never received any documents, whatsoever, from Mr. 
Schwartz, offering to purchase the property for Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) or, for that 
matter, for any amount of money. 
18. I had traveled to Kane County, from my home in Sun City, Arizona, which is near 
Phoenix, to attend this auction specifically with the intent of buying this lot among other real 
property assets. When I bid at an auction, I do not initiate bids on any lots unless I am prepared 
to go forward and buy the same. Once again, I bid quickly with intent and in reference to this rim 
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lot, regarding which it's size, topography, and location were well known to me, I was more than 
prepared, once again, to bid in excess of Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000 00) at the tax 
sale. 
19. I have made myself available for depositions for the Plaintiff in the instant case 
and continue to be available in Sun City, Arizona. If put under oath, my testimony would be no 
different than that set forth in this affidavit. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true, and correct copy of the above and foregoing Affidavit of 
William C. Pringle was placed in the United States mail, at St. George, Utah, with first-class 
postage thereon fully prepaid, on the ri_^ day May, 2003, addressed as follows: 
Stephen EL Schwartz 
350 North Wand'rings End 
PO Box 446 
Hatch, UT 84735-0446 
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lot, regarding which it's size, topography, and location were well known to me, I was more than 
prepared, once again, to bid in excess of Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000 00) at the tax 
sale. 
19. I have made myself available for depositions for the Plaintiff in the instant case 
and continue to be available in Sun City, Arizona. If put under oath, my testimony would be no 
different than that set forth in this affidavit. 
FURTHER AFFIANT S AYETH NOT 
DATED this day of May. 2003 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
C=FCI«. SEsL 5 
i & CHRjSTirC SODERLUND \ 
A
 ^ S ^ f e T '^c's'v Pjotic State of Mzona t 
^ ^ ^ f / M^R CCPA COUNTY { 
t ^ k ± ^ \*\ Co^ - ExDrss JUV 15 2003 J 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a Ml, true, and correct copy of the above and foregoing Affidavit of 
William C. Pringle was placed in the United States mail, at St. George, Utah, with first-class 
postage thereon fully prepaid, on the ^7_, day May, 2003, addressed as follows: 
Stephen H. Schwartz 
350 North Wand'rings End 
PO Box 446 
Hatch, UT 84735-0446 
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